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Abstract 
 I investigate if managers’ tendency to report opportunistically depends on the effort 
they expend in acquiring the information they need to report. I develop and test theory 
positing that expending effort to acquire information can justify opportunistic behavior but 
also enhances a sense of responsibility discouraging unethical actions. I predict that the 
dominant effect depends on whether the reporting environment induces sufficient concerns 
for honesty. In my 2 × 2 experiment, managers are either endowed with information to report 
or required to expend intellectual effort to earn it. I also manipulate whether concerns about 
honesty are triggered by framing reporting in terms of profit allocation or an ethical dilemma. 
I find that when honesty is not triggered, managers report earned information more 
opportunistically than endowed information. However, when the reporting context triggers 
honesty concerns, the negative effect of earned information on opportunistic reporting is 
alleviated. These results have strong implications for theory and practice by showing the 
conditions under which acquiring information detrimentally affects reporting behavior. 
 
Keywords: information acquisition, opportunistic reporting, other-regarding preferences, 
honesty, budgeting, slack, effort, experiment
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1. Introduction  
 Acquiring and reporting information are crucial aspects of managers’ jobs (e.g., Bruns 
and McKinnon 1993; Church et al. 2014). For example, managers gather information about 
local markets and production processes to inform upper management’s marketing, 
production, and capital budgeting decisions (Evans et al. 2001). Although the accounting 
literature acknowledges the importance of both acquiring and reporting information, it often 
treats these managerial tasks as distinct responsibilities (e.g., Brown et al. 2009; Schneider et 
al. 2015). However, the duties are logically linked and could potentially affect each other. In 
this paper, I investigate whether the process of acquiring information influences managers’ 
reporting of it.   
 In particular, I develop and test theory suggesting that making an effort to acquire 
information can influence opportunistic reporting of it. Although managers are often in the 
best position to acquire information about particular aspects of an organization (e.g., because 
they spend a lot of time with local markets, customers, and production processes and are in 
close proximity to them), the ease with which they can obtain this information varies widely 
in practice (e.g., Huber 1991; Inkpen 2000; Li et al. 2010; Smith et al. 2016). Obtaining 
information can sometimes be quite effortful, requiring multiple analyses or synthesis from 
numerous sources, but other times, it can be gained more easily.1 
 Since managers’ objectives are not always aligned with those of the parties to whom 
they report, they regularly have incentives to report information in an opportunistic way and 
benefit at the expense of another party (e.g., Evans et al. 2001; Caskey et al. 2010). The 
behavioral literature identifies two variables that can mitigate opportunistic reporting: other-
                                                          
1 Various factors can determine whether information acquisition requires more or less effort, such as the type 
and format of the requested information, the organizational environment, technology, and the expertise and 
experience of the knowledge acquirer. I do not distinguish between these different causes in this paper, but it is 
noteworthy that many of them can be influenced by organizations (e.g., the format of the requested information, 
technology).  
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regarding preferences (i.e., preferences over one’s own as well as others’ payoffs, motivated 
by factors such as altruism, inequity aversion, and fairness concerns) and honesty preferences 
(i.e., preferences for making truthful disclosures) (e.g., Luft 1997; Sprinkle 2003; Fehr and 
Schmidt 2006; Mittendorf 2006; Rankin et al. 2008; Maas and Van Rinsum 2013). The 
theory I develop and test suggests that effortful acquisition of information decreases the role 
of other-regarding preferences but enhances the role of honesty in mitigating opportunistic 
reporting.  
On the one hand, I expect individuals to be less likely to exhibit other-regarding 
preferences if they exert more effort to earn the information they need to report. Because 
individuals invest time, effort, and skills to gain information, they can more easily justify 
serving their own interests by reporting opportunistically (Hsee, 1996; Pierce et al. 2001). On 
the other hand, honesty preferences are likely to have a larger impact when information is 
acquired in an effortful way because individuals might feel more personally responsible for 
such information (Nonaka 1994). Increased responsibility can discourage unethical actions 
(Bandura 1999; Charness 2000; Libby et al. 2018).  
 I predict that organizational design choices with respect to the decision-making 
context determine which of the two effects will be dominant. For example, organizations can 
promote honesty through contextual cues or the framing of the reporting decision (e.g., 
Rankin et al. 2008; Douthit and Stevens 2015). I expect that contexts that do not trigger 
sufficient concern for honesty will be associated with more opportunistic reporting with 
effortful relative to effortless information acquisition, while contexts that trigger sufficient 
concern for honesty will decrease opportunistic reporting to a larger extent when individuals 
exert more effort to acquire information.  
 I examine the effect of information acquisition on opportunistic reporting in a budget 
reporting context. In my experiment, managers have to implement a project that incurs a cost. 
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Only managers learn this cost, and they therefore submit a budget report to the owner. 
Opportunistic reporting increases (decreases) the monetary payoff for managers (owners). In 
this experimental setting, I manipulate the acquisition of information (endowed versus earned 
information) and whether the reporting context induces honesty (no honesty trigger versus 
honesty trigger).  
In the endowed information condition, managers could simply read the project’s 
implementation cost on their computer screen. In the earned information condition, managers 
had to expend intellectual effort to determine the project’s implementation cost. To identify 
how honesty triggers within the reporting context influence the effect of earned and endowed 
information on opportunistic reporting, I use the “mode of reporting” manipulation following 
Rankin et al. (2008), Douthit and Stevens (2015), and Brown et al. (2017). Specifically, I 
vary whether the report is framed as a mere allocation of profit (no honesty trigger condition) 
or as an ethical dilemma (honesty trigger condition). In both conditions, opportunistic 
reporting increases a manager’s payoff and decreases an owner’s payoff. Hence, to the extent 
that managers care about owners’ payoff, their other-regarding preferences should decrease 
opportunistic reporting in both reporting context conditions. However, the motivation to 
report honestly should be more salient when the reporting decision is framed as an ethical 
dilemma. Thus, in this condition, honesty preferences are important in mitigating 
opportunistic reporting on top of other-regarding preferences. Accordingly, I capture the 
effect of other-regarding preferences by studying the no honesty trigger condition and I 
isolate the incremental effect of honesty preferences by assessing the difference between the 
conditions that trigger and do not trigger honesty concerns. 
 Consistent with my predictions, experimental results show that managers report more 
opportunistically with earned information relative to endowed information when honesty 
concerns are not triggered. In a comparison of the no honesty trigger to the honesty trigger 
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condition, I find that the incremental effect of honesty causes opportunistic reporting to 
decrease. However, the manner of information acquisition interacts with the reporting 
context, such that opportunistic reporting decreases to a greater extent with earned 
information. This outcome indicates that when the reporting context induces honesty 
concerns, managers take these concerns into account more with earned information. 
Supplemental analyses provide additional insights into participants’ perceptions about what is 
fair and honest with earned information relative to endowed information. Furthermore, I 
study the earned information conditions in depth to investigate how characteristics of earning 
information affect the tendency to report opportunistically.  
 These results are important for several reasons. First, I contribute to the literature on 
managerial reporting by considering the fundamental phase of acquiring the information that 
needs to be reported. I explicitly recognize that managers often have to expend effort to 
gather relevant information, and I show that this undertaking can affect their reporting 
behavior. Whether or not the effect is detrimental depends on the organizational context. 
 As such, my findings also have important implications for practice because an 
organization can influence other-regarding and honesty triggers. For example, results of my 
experiment indicate that carefully framing the budget request to induce honesty might be 
advisable when acquiring information requires a lot of effort. Moreover, organizations have 
several other means at their disposal to trigger other-regarding and honesty preferences. 
Potential approaches include changing the span of control (Dierynck 2012), altering the 
transparency of payoffs (Douthit and Stevens 2015), installing an organizational culture that 
values honesty (Trevino 1986), and adopting a code of ethics with public certification 
(Davidson and Stevens 2013). However, these design choices do not come without a cost, 
and my results may help to identify when investing in such changes is more or less beneficial. 
For example, in complex business settings in which gaining information requires substantial 
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effort, it can be more beneficial to increase the saliency of honesty relative to environments in 
which information is acquired more easily. As another practical implication, my findings add 
to recent concerns about the unintended consequences of the use of systems that facilitate 
knowledge acquisition (e.g., Sutton et al. 2018). My results suggest that the benefits of 
installing such systems would ultimately depend on organizational design choices with 
respect to the decision-making context. 
 Next, the acquisition of information is a crucial aspect of various accounting settings 
such as auditing, budgeting, financial statements, and taxes (e.g., Balakrishnan 1991; Sansing 
1993; Einhorn and Ziv 2007; Nelson and Tayler 2007). Indeed, managers also gather 
information intended for the audit committee (e.g., Caskey et al. 2010), analysts and investors 
(e.g., Bens et al. 2012), and tax authorities (e.g., Omer and Yetman 2007). The ease with 
which relevant information can be acquired varies widely across and within all these settings. 
Although honesty and other-regarding preference are traditionally studied in managerial 
accounting settings, they are increasingly receiving attention in these other accounting areas 
(e.g., Fischbacher and Stefani 2007; Coricelli et al. 2010; de Bruin 2013; Königsgruber and 
Palan 2015; Hurley and Mayhew 2019). By showing that having to acquire information in an 
effortful way has opposing effects on honesty and other-regarding preference, I therefore also 
contribute more generally to a better understanding of information acquisition in accounting 
systems.  
 Finally, since reporting can be considered a type of information sharing, I also 
contribute to the emerging literature on this theme (e.g., Hwang et al. 2009; Bol and Leiby 
2015; Haesebrouck et al. 2015, 2018; Tafkov et al. 2017; Berger et al. 2018). Haesebrouck et 
al. (2015) show that sharing laboriously acquired information is perceived as a particularly 
costly activity for which the sharers feel that they should be rewarded in return. This 
interpretation is consistent with the results I find here since individuals believe they deserve a 
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higher payoff, and hence report more opportunistically, when they expend more effort to 
acquire their information. However, I also demonstrate in this study that salient honesty 
preferences can alleviate the need to be compensated for sharing laboriously acquired 
information. 
  In the next section, I discuss the relevant literature and develop the hypotheses. 
Section 3 presents the experimental design, followed by the results in section 4. Section 5 
provides the conclusion and discussion. 
2. Background and hypotheses development 
In this section, I first briefly summarize earlier literature on both acquiring and reporting 
information. Next, I connect these two constructs and explain how information acquisition 
affects reporting behavior in the hypotheses development section. 
Background 
Acquiring information to report 
When managers are asked to report information, they have to collect raw data and 
derive relevant interpretations by editing, correcting, analyzing, and summarizing the 
material (Davenport and Prusak 1998; Schneider et al. 2015). During this process, they 
frequently rely on observations, personal contacts, and informal reports (Bruns and 
McKinnon 1993). Although the accounting literature acknowledges the importance of the 
information acquisition task (e.g., Ewusi-Mensah 1981; Schneider et al. 2015), it only briefly 
recognizes that how individuals acquire their information might influence how they act upon 
it. Indeed, not only the information per se, but also the process of acquiring it can affect 
subsequent behavior or decision making. For example, Nelson and Tayler (2007) investigate 
whether making users of financial statements perform a transformational analysis themselves 
rather than simply providing them with the results of such an analysis affects their judgments. 
The authors find that having to acquire results in an effortful way affects judgments to a 
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greater extent because it increases individuals’ perception of how well they are informed. 
Since managers that make reporting decisions differ in many respects (e.g., incentives and 
responsibilities) from financial statement users that make judgment decisions, investigating 
the effect of effortful information acquisition on managerial reporting is worthwhile.  
 Within the context of managerial reporting, the tasks of acquiring and reporting 
information are logically intertwined. Managers are asked to report information because they 
are typically in the best position to acquire it. Since they spend a lot of time with particular 
aspects of the organization (e.g., local markets, customers, production processes), they often 
have the opportunity to acquire superior information about them (Milgrom and Roberts 
1992).2 Nevertheless, the ease with which they can obtain this information varies widely in 
practice (e.g., Huber 1991; Inkpen 2000; Li et al. 2010; Smith et al. 2016). Acquiring relevant 
information can be rather straightforward; however, it might sometimes require substantial 
effort, for example, when managers have to combine information from a variety of sources or 
perform several analyses. In addition, recent technological developments influence the effort 
required to gather information (e.g., Sutton et al. 2018). As I argue below, a higher level of 
effort to acquire information could have an impact on managers’ tendency to report it 
opportunistically.  
 In the next section, I discuss the determinants of opportunistic reporting as identified 
by the behavioral literature. 
Determinants of reporting behavior 
 Since managers’ objectives are not always aligned with those of the parties to whom 
they report, they may have self-serving incentives to opportunistically report their private 
information (Webb 2002). For example, managers might report inflated results to an upper 
                                                          
2 Moreover, even if another employee can observe the same information, that person can still lack the expertise 
or background needed to understand and evaluate it (Ditillo 2004). 
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manager in order to garner a higher bonus (Jensen 2001). However, behavioral studies in 
managerial accounting suggest that individuals may forgo the self-serving benefits from 
opportunistic reporting for two reasons, specifically, other-regarding preferences and honesty 
concerns (e.g., Luft 1997; Gneezy 2005; Rankin et al. 2008; Sheremeta and Shields 2013; 
Maas and Van Rinsum 2013).  
 Other-regarding preferences are preferences that consider one’s own as well as others’ 
outcomes, and they can be driven by various motives, such as altruism, fairness concerns, and 
aversion to inequality (Cox 2004; Fehr and Schmidt 2006; Dana et al. 2007). Since reporting 
decisions usually affect not only the reporter’s outcome, but also those of other parties, these 
preferences can influence reporting behavior (Cox 2004; Dierynck 2012; Maas and Van 
Rinsum 2013).3 To the extent that individuals not only care about their own benefits from 
reporting opportunistically but are also sensitive to the potential harm to others, they will not 
behave in an entirely opportunistic manner (e.g., Gneezy 2005; Rankin et al. 2008; Sheremeta 
and Shields 2013). Consequently, other-regarding preferences can decrease opportunistic 
reporting.  
 Honesty preferences are preferences for making truthful statements (Mittendorf 2006). 
These preferences can also be driven by several motives, such as social conditioning, moral 
reasoning, and the desire to preserve favorable self-regard (Mazar et al. 2008; Rankin et al. 
2008). Many people experience a disutility as a consequence of explicitly misrepresenting 
facts (e.g., Evans et al. 2001). In that way, an aversion to lying makes individuals less 
inclined to report opportunistically (Sen 1997).4  
                                                          
3 In fact, when managers focus on their self-serving benefits and report opportunistically, they often harm other 
parties. This assumption seems to be relevant for many economic events (Gneezy 2005). For example, if 
managers inflate results when reporting to upper management in order to obtain a higher bonus, the profit of 
owners and shareholders ultimately decreases. 
4 Although some researchers have questioned the role of honesty in mitigating opportunistic reporting (e.g., 
Salterio and Webb 2006), others such as Rankin et al. (2008), Sheremata and Shields (2013), and Douthit and 
Stevens (2015) have distinguished honesty concerns from other-regarding preferences. In doing so, they show 
that honesty has an incremental, diminishing effect on opportunistic reporting, on top of other-regarding 
preferences. 
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 In sum, previous research indicates that both other-regarding preferences and honesty 
preferences can play a role in mitigating opportunistic reporting (e.g., Rankin et al. 2008; 
Douthit and Stevens 2015; Sheremeta and Shields 2013). As Fehr and Schmidt (2006) 
indicate, the question is not so much whether many people have other-regarding and honesty 
preferences, which is already supported by ample evidence, but under which conditions these 
preferences have important economic and social effects. One of these conditions is the 
organizational context since organizations can promote the saliency of honesty, for example, 
through contextual cues or the framing of the reporting decision (e.g., Rankin et al. 2008; 
Douthit and Stevens 2015; Brown et al. 2015). When honesty concerns are not salient, mainly 
other-regarding preferences will affect reporting behavior; whereas, when honesty concerns 
are made salient, both other-regarding and honesty preferences can influence reporting 
behavior.  
In the hypotheses development below, I suggest effortful information acquisition 
might lead to opposing effects on other-regarding and honesty preferences. Effortful 
information acquisition may reduce how much other-regarding preferences matter, but it 
could also lead to higher honesty concerns. As such, opportunistic reporting could either 
increase or decrease as a consequence of effortful information acquisition. The organizational 
context will determine which effect will dominate by making honesty more or less salient.  
Development of hypotheses 
To construct my hypotheses, I rely on the theory of psychological ownership (Pierce 
et al. 2001, 2003). Psychological ownership is defined as a state wherein a person perceives 
an asset (material or immaterial in nature) as being his or hers (Pierce et al., 2001, 2003; 
Brown et al. 2014). The core of psychological ownership is the feeling of possessiveness and 
being psychologically tied to an asset; the asset becomes part of the self (Pierce et al. 2003; 
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Brown et al. 2014). One of the main determinants of psychological ownership is the 
investment of oneself in the asset via time, effort, skills, and intellect, and some of its 
important psychological and behavioral effects are increased feelings of deservingness 
(entitlement) and responsibility (e.g., Pierce et al. 2001, 2003; Shu and Peck 2011). These 
effects are documented by a large body of literature for several types of assets (e.g., Van 
Dyne and Pierce 2004; Norton et al. 2012). 
Although psychological ownership is often associated with material assets, it can also 
be felt toward immaterial assets, such as ideas, information, and knowledge (Pierce et al. 
2001). As with material assets, individuals invest time, effort, and (intellectual) skills in the 
information they acquire. As such, the self-acquired information becomes intimately 
entwined with their egos (Davenport and Prusak 1998), and individuals might feel more 
entitled and personally responsible for and committed to it (Nonaka 1994). Below, I argue 
that these feelings in turn affect individuals’ other-regarding and honesty preferences in 
determining opportunistic reporting. 
Information acquisition and other-regarding preferences 
When individuals have to make decisions, they try to maintain a sense of 
accountability (Hsee 1996; Schweitzer and Hsee 2002; Church et al. 2012). As such, they are 
more likely to make decisions in their best interest if they can make seemingly reasonable 
justifications for them (Kunda 1990). Previous research indicates that individuals’ feelings of 
deservingness and entitlement can be important in justifying selfish decision making (e.g., 
Cameron et al. 2010, Nichol 2018). For example, Cherry (2001), Cherry et al. (2002), and 
Oxoby and Spraggon (2008) find in a dictator game that individuals who earn money that is 
to be divided between themselves and a receiver perceive themselves as more deserving of it 
than those who are endowed with the money. As a consequence, individuals who earn the 
money take their other-regarding preferences less into account and make more selfish 
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decisions (i.e., they keep more money for themselves and offer less to the receiver). 
Similarly, two recent working papers conclude from experiments that feelings of 
deservingness lead to more opportunistic reporting because they enable justification of this 
behavior (Douthit and Majerczyk 2015; Brown et al. 2016). 
 In a similar vein, individuals that exert effort to earn information can more easily 
justify opportunistic reporting. When individuals earn information, they invest their time, 
effort, skills, and intellect (De Dreu et al. 2008; Pierce et al. 2001; Zárraga and Bonache 
2005). These investments engender feelings of ownership, and the individuals can justify to 
themselves that they deserve (are entitled to) a higher payoff (Adams 1965; Hoffman and 
Spitzer 1986). In the context of managerial reporting, they can allocate self-serving benefits 
to themselves by reporting more opportunistically, yet they will feel as though they are being 
fair (Dana et al. 2007). This rationalization for opportunistic reporting would not be possible 
with effortless information acquisition.  
In sum, managers might feel that they can more easily justify a greater payoff for 
themselves relative to others with effortful relative to effortless information acquisition. 
When the reporting context does not make honesty concerns salient, these other-regarding 
preferences will dominate the reporting decision. As such, opportunistic reporting will be 
higher with effortful relative to effortless information acquisition. Hence, I predict the 
following effect: 
HYPOTHESIS 1. When the reporting context does not make honesty salient, 
opportunistic reporting will be higher with effortful relative to effortless information 
acquisition. 
 
Honesty preferences 
 However, as already explained, individuals often also have preferences for honesty 
because they experience a disutility from lying (e.g., Evans et al. 2001). Indeed, most 
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individuals value honesty and prefer to view themselves as being honest. Dishonest behavior 
requires a negative revision of these individuals’ self-perception. Thus, even when honesty 
requires investments of effort or entails a loss of financial payoffs, individuals will adhere to 
it to retain their positive view of themselves (Mazar et al. 2008).  
 When the reporting context makes honesty concerns salient, honesty preferences 
become more prominent. As shown by earlier research, this prominence will cause a decrease 
in opportunistic reporting (Rankin et al. 2008; Douthit and Stevens 2015). To replicate this 
finding, I formulate my second hypothesis as follows: 
HYPOTHESIS 2. When the reporting context makes honesty salient, opportunistic
 reporting will decrease relative to when it does not make honesty salient. 
 
Information acquisition and honesty preferences 
As argued before, expending effort to acquire information will also increase feelings 
of responsibility and commitment (e.g., Pierce et al. 2001, 2003). Lying about the effortfully 
earned information could therefore also have an impact on individuals’ view of themselves to 
a larger (more negative) extent (Mazar et al. 2008; Schwartz 1968). Indeed, the feelings of 
ownership, responsibility, and commitment could make people more mindful of their moral 
standards, and any dishonest action is more likely to be reflected in their self-concept. In the 
same vein, feelings of ownership and responsibility play an important role in moral 
disengagement theory. This theory describes the cognitive reframing of (un)ethical behavior 
such that ethical standards (do not) apply to oneself in a particular context (Bandura 1999). 
According to this theory, individuals with increased feelings of responsibility are more likely 
to make ethical decisions (e.g., Bandura 1999; Detert et al. 2008). 
Recent experimental findings are in line with this theory. In a cost reporting setting, 
Libby et al. (2018) find that managers with more responsibility report more honestly than 
those with less responsibility. In a more abstract setting, Charness et al. (2019) find that 
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participants physically handling money cheat remarkably less compared to when the 
experimenter handles the money. The authors argue that individuals may be more honest 
when they feel more responsible. They also posit that an increased moral cost of lying might 
make it more difficult to cheat and maintain a positive self-image. Although Charness et al. 
(2019) mainly speculate and do not theorize or empirically show much about the mechanism 
behind their finding, it is consistent with the theory outlined above: investing time, effort, and 
skills in an asset increases feelings of responsibility and ultimately decreases unethical 
behavior. 
In line with the above, I argue that it becomes easier to displace responsibility when 
information is acquired without effort; whereas, increased feelings of ownership, 
commitment, and responsibility will arise when information is acquired in an effortful way. 
From the preceding arguments, it follows that managers might care more about honesty when 
information is acquired in an effortful way relative to an effortless way and expending effort 
to acquire information can thus discourage unethical actions. As such, a decrease in 
opportunistic reporting caused by a context that makes honesty concerns salient will be larger 
for information that is earned in a more effortful way since individuals care more about 
honesty in this case. Therefore, I predict the following interaction effect:  
HYPOTHESIS 3. The decrease in opportunistic reporting associated with a reporting 
context that makes honesty salient will be larger for effortful relative to effortless 
information acquisition. 
 
 
3. Method 
Participants and design 
 I examine the effect of information acquisition on managerial reporting via a budget 
reporting experiment. To test my hypotheses, I conducted a computer-based 2 × 2 experiment 
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with z-Tree as the software package (Fischbacher 2007).5 In total, 164 undergraduate 
business students from a large European university participated in the experiment (36 percent 
female, mean age about 22 years).6 The experiment was conducted in eight sessions, with 20 
or 22 participants per session. A session consisted of eight decision rounds and lasted about 
55 minutes on average. Participants received a course credit and earned on average €8.89 for 
their participation. Their total payoff was calculated as the sum of their payoffs in each 
decision round of the experiment. 
The research design for this study is broadly based on the typical setting used in 
budget reporting experiments (e.g., Douthit and Stevens 2015; Evans et al. 2001; Hannan et 
al. 2006; Rankin et al. 2008). Participants were randomly assigned to the role of manager or 
owner, and they remained in the same role throughout the experiment. Every manager was 
randomly paired with an owner and was rematched with a different owner after every 
decision round. None of the participants ever learned the identity of the person with whom 
they were paired.  
Task 
In each of the eight decision rounds, managers had to implement a project that 
incurred costs. The costs of implementing the eight projects were randomly determined 
upfront and were the same for every session. Both manager and owner knew that the 
implementation cost of the project would fall within a range of 0 to 200, with a uniform 
distribution of [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, …, 199, 200]. The numbers represented euro cents; hence a 
cost of 100 equaled €1.00. Managers and owners also knew that every project yielded 
revenue of 200 (€2.00), but only managers could find out the actual implementation costs. To 
                                                          
5 Approval was granted by the institution where the experiment took place. 
6 One participant was removed from the analyses after indicating the instructions were not understood. 
15 
 
inform the owner about this project, managers had to submit a budget report. These specifics 
were explained to all participants in the experimental instructions.  
In this setting, I manipulated the acquisition of information (endowed information 
versus earned information) and the reporting context (no honesty trigger versus honesty 
trigger) between participants. 
Manipulations 
Information acquisition: endowed versus earned information 
 In the endowed information condition, managers received a private cost form in every 
decision round. This cost form revealed the project’s actual implementation cost.7 In the 
earned information condition, managers had to expend effort to learn the actual cost. In 
particular, they had to solve a number series puzzle in every decision round (based on 
Haesebrouck et al. [2015]) to find out the project’s implementation cost. The solution to the 
puzzle was the actual cost for that period. Number series puzzles provide a sequence of 
numbers that follow a discernable pattern. Managers had to recognize the pattern to obtain 
the next number in the sequence. An example of a number series puzzle used in one of the 
decision rounds is the following: 69, 75, 76, 80, 83, 85, 90, 90, ___. In this example, the odd 
and even number positions follow different patterns. For the numbers in the odd positions 
(69, 76, 83, etc.), the pattern is based on adding 7 to the previous number to find the next 
number. For the numbers in the even positions (75, 80, 85, etc.), the pattern is based on 
adding 5 to the previous number to find the next number. The number we are looking for in 
the overall sequence is in the odd position; therefore, the solution is 97 (90 + 7). Accordingly, 
the actual implementation cost of the project is 97 in this decision round.  
                                                          
7 Note that in a typical budgeting experiment, managers are informed about their private information in this way 
(e.g., Rankin et al. 2008; Douthit and Stevens 2015). 
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 Because these number series puzzles could be difficult to solve, managers who had 
trouble solving a puzzle could request hints after working on it for several minutes. In that 
way, all managers could find out the project’s actual implementation cost.8 First, a button 
labeled “HINT 1” appeared on the computer screen, followed several minutes later by a 
button labeled “HINT 2.” If managers pressed these buttons, information that would help 
them solve the puzzle was provided. Even when the hints became available, the instructions 
urged managers to try their best to solve the number series puzzle without them. However, 
they could press the HINT 1 button if they became stuck. Further, the instructions asked them 
to only press the HINT 2 button if the first hint still did not allow them to solve the puzzle. In 
total, 16 hints could be requested (two hints per number series puzzle, one number series 
puzzle for each of the eight rounds). Summed up over the eight rounds, the average 
participant requested 1.88 out of 16 hints (with a standard deviation of 1.25). With the help of 
the hints, participants were always able to solve the puzzles. 
 In summary, at the start of each decision round, both the manager and the owner knew 
that the actual implementation cost would fall within a range of 0 to 200. Next, managers 
found out the actual implementation cost, either from reading their private cost form 
(endowed information condition) or by solving a number series puzzle (earned information 
condition). Managers always learned this cost, while owners would never learn it. All 
participants were aware of this information asymmetry. 
Reporting context: no honesty trigger versus honesty trigger 
Next, I use the “mode of reporting” manipulation as employed by Rankin et al. (2008) 
to trigger honesty concerns. Specifically, I manipulate the reporting context by varying 
whether the report is framed as a mere allocation of profit or as an ethical dilemma. Thereby, 
                                                          
8 Not solving a puzzle was not an option. Participants could not continue in a decision round if they did not 
solve the puzzle of that round. 
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managers either had to (1) report (allocate) a portion of the project’s profit to the owner (no 
honesty trigger condition), or (2) report the project’s cost to the owner (honesty trigger 
condition). As explained below, the allocated profit or reported cost determined the payoffs 
of managers and owners in such a way that more budgetary slack (i.e., allocating less profit 
or reporting a higher cost) would lead to a higher (lower) payoff for managers (owners). 
Managers also received a fixed salary of 100.9  
 In the no honesty trigger condition, managers reported a portion of the project’s profit 
to be returned to the owner. Managers could allocate any portion of the project’s profit 
between 0 and the total profit (200 minus the project’s actual cost) to the owner. The 
allocated amount was the owner’s payoff. The payoff to the manager was the remainder of 
the profit (total profit minus the portion allocated to the owner) plus the fixed payment of 
100.  
 In the honesty trigger condition, managers reported the project’s cost to the owner and 
could keep any difference between the actual and reported cost. Hence, the payoff to the 
managers was, in addition to the 100 fixed salary, the reported cost minus the actual cost to 
implement the project. The payoff to the owner was 200 (i.e., the revenue of the project) 
minus the reported cost. Table 1 summarizes these payoffs of managers and owners across 
the reporting context conditions. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 In both the honesty and the no honesty trigger condition, more opportunistic reporting 
(i.e., reporting a smaller profit allocation or a higher cost) increases the manager’s payoff but 
decreases the owner’s payoff. As such, to the extent that managers care about the owners’ 
                                                          
9 Previous research also provides managers with a fixed salary to make sure no extreme tension exists between 
their payoff and their preferences to report honestly (e.g., Rankin et al. 2008). Without a fixed salary, managers 
who report honestly would always have a payoff of zero. 
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payoff, their other-regarding preferences should decrease opportunistic reporting in both 
conditions. However, the motivation to report honestly should be more salient in the honesty 
trigger condition because making an untrue representation of facts is only possible in this 
condition. In particular, since managers in the no honesty trigger condition are only asked to 
divide the profit and report the portion they allocate to the owner, they cannot lie, even if they 
induce slack. Indeed, this condition forces managers to frame the budgeting task as merely an 
allocation of the profit. In the honesty trigger condition, however, preferences for honesty, on 
top of other-regarding preferences, can influence managers’ reporting decision because 
managers who report an untrue cost are explicitly lying to the owner. Hence, I capture the 
effect of other-regarding preference by studying the amount of slack in the no honesty trigger 
condition and the incremental effect of honesty by studying the difference in slack between 
the condition with and without the honesty trigger.10 This approach enables me to distinguish 
the effect of other-regarding preferences from honesty preferences in mitigating opportunistic 
reporting. In that way, I can test the theory explained above that suggests opposing effects of 
endowed information relative to earned information for these two preferences. 
Procedure 
I randomly assigned participants to a computer terminal situated in one of two rooms. 
Participants in one room were managers, and participants in the other room were owners. 
Participants started by reading their instructions, after which they completed a short quiz to 
ensure they understood their role, the task, and the payoff structure. Participants could only 
move on to the next question once they answered the current question correctly. In addition, 
there was a “practice tool” before managers had to make their real decision to make sure they 
knew the consequences of their decisions. With this tool, they could calculate the impact of 
                                                          
10 Hence, to compare the effect of honesty for the earned and endowed information condition, I should study the 
interaction effect (i.e., test whether the decrease when moving from no honesty to the honesty trigger condition 
is equal for endowed versus earned information). 
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the allocated profit/reported cost of their choice on their own and the owners’ payoff. After 
the eight decision rounds, participants were asked to complete the post-experimental 
questionnaire, which included questions on the factors influencing managers’ decisions and 
on participants’ demographics and personality traits. 
4. Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Before looking into my main variables of interest, I test for random assignment across 
conditions with respect to demographics and personality traits like age, work experience, and 
social value orientation. Results show no significant differences, except for 
Machiavellianism, which is somewhat lower in the No Honesty Trigger/Earned Information 
condition and the Honesty Trigger/Endowed Information condition compared to the other 
two conditions (see panel A of Table 2).11 Since previous research shows that individuals 
who are more Machiavellian are inclined to induce more slack in a budgeting setting (e.g., 
Hartmann and Maas 2010), extracting the variation from this covariate enhances my ability to 
statistically isolate reporting effects apart from any personality traits. Hence, I adjust for 
Machiavellianism and include it as a covariate in all my analyses reported below. 
Panel A of Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the main dependent variable, 
Average Slack. This measure is calculated as the eight-period mean of slack claimed over 
slack available.12 A higher value for average slack indicates that the manager reported more 
                                                          
11 The following four items, measured on a 7-point Likert Scale with scores ranging from 1 (“I totally disagree”) 
to 7 (“I totally agree”), capture Machiavellianism: “I tend to manipulate others to get my way,” “I have used 
deceit or lied to get my way,” “I have used flattery to get my way,” and “I tend to exploit others towards my 
own end” (Jonason and Webster 2010). A higher score indicates the individual has a more Machiavellian 
personality. Machiavellianism is known to be a stable personality trait (Jonason and Webster 2010). Individuals 
with this trait tend to detach from considerations of ethics and perform actions that profit the self (Schepers 
2003).  
12 Note that the maximum slack available is equal across conditions since the cost in a specific period was the 
same for every participant. More particularly, the cost sequence for the eight periods was 159, 97, 62, 17, 4, 145, 
104, and 34. Hence, if a manager reported, for example, a cost of 179 in the first period, he or she claimed 20 of 
the available slack of 41 (= 200 − 159). Consequently, the slack claimed over slack available to this manager 
equals 49% (=20/41) in the first period. 
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opportunistically. From the descriptive statistics, it is apparent that average slack is higher for 
earned information than for endowed information when no honesty trigger is present. 
However, in moving from the no honesty to the honesty trigger condition, average slack 
decreases. This decrease seems to be larger for earned information than for endowed 
information, indicating that the effect of honesty is more pronounced for earned information. 
Figure 1 presents this evidence graphically, and it is consistent with my three hypotheses. In 
the following section, I formally test these hypotheses. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Hypotheses test 
 I performed an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) test with Average Slack as the 
dependent variable, Information Acquisition and Reporting Context as independent variables, 
and Machiavellianism as a covariate to test hypothesis 1, 2, and 3 (tabulated in panel A of 
Table 3).13,14 Given the specific pattern predicted in my hypotheses, I also performed contrast 
coding (tabulated in panel B of Table 3).  
Recall that Hypothesis 1 posits that when the reporting environment does not make 
honesty salient, opportunistic reporting will be higher with effortful relative to effortless 
information acquisition. In the experiment, Hypothesis 1 is supported if managers in the no 
honesty trigger condition induce more slack when information is earned relative to being 
endowed. Descriptive statistics reported earlier confirmed slack is higher for earned 
information than for endowed information when no honesty trigger is present (see panel A of 
Table 2). To formally test whether this difference is significant, I examine the simple effect 
                                                          
13 I also ran a repeated-measure ANCOVA to test for period effects. However, there is no significant effect from 
period.  
14 To test whether Machiavellianism is interacting with one of my main variables of interest, I run a regression 
analysis with Average Slack as dependent variable and the main effects, two- and three-way interaction effects 
of Machiavellianism, Knowledge Acquisition, and Mode of Reporting as independent variables. In this 
regression, the two- and three-way interaction effects with Machiavellianism are not significant (not tabulated). 
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of information acquisition within the no honesty trigger condition. Consistent with H1, the 
simple effect test shows that average slack is significantly higher for earned than for endowed 
information when the context does not trigger honesty (F = 3.56, p = 0.03).15 Hence, 
managers’ own payoff gets a higher weight relative to the owners’ payoff when information 
is earned relative to endowed, leading to more budgetary slack (opportunistic reporting) with 
earned information.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 Hypothesis 2 posits that opportunistic reporting will decrease when moving from the 
unsalient to the salient honesty condition. To test this hypothesis, I study the main effect of 
the reporting context. As indicated by the ANCOVA (F = 9.18, p < 0.01), the reporting 
context has a highly significant effect on budgetary slack. Descriptive statistics in panel A of 
Table 2 and the graphical depiction in Figure 1 also show that the effect follows the expected 
direction. I therefore conclude that the evidence supports H2. 
 Hypothesis 3 predicts that the decrease in opportunistic reporting associated with a 
reporting context that makes honesty salient, should be larger with earned than with endowed 
information. The ANCOVA test reported in panel A of Table 3 shows that there is a 
significant interaction effect of information acquisition and reporting context on average 
slack (F = 4.13, p = 0.02), which provides support for this hypothesis. However, since H3 
predicts a specific pattern, I also rely on contrast coding (Buckless and Ravenscroft 1990; 
Guggenmos et al. 2018). Consistent with the patterns predicted across my hypotheses, I 
define the contrasts as 2 for the earned information/no honesty trigger condition, 1 for the 
endowed information/no honesty trigger condition, −1 for the endowed information/honesty 
trigger condition, and −2 for the earned information/honesty trigger condition. To test the 
                                                          
15 Unless stated otherwise, p-values are reported on a one-tailed basis, given the directional predictions for the 
effects. 
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significance of these contrasts, I use the three-part approach suggested by Guggenmos et al. 
(2018). First, after a visual evaluation of Figure 2, I conclude that the observed data fit the 
predicted pattern reasonably well. Second, panel B of Table 3 reports the p-value of the 
contrast, which provides support for Hypothesis 3 (F = 12.74, p < 0.01). In addition, the p-
value of the residual variance is insignificant (F = 0.73, p = 0.48), indicating that the model 
contrast explains all the between-group variance. Third, the size of the contrast variance 
residual indicates that about 10% of the between-cells variance remains after accounting for 
the contrast (q2 = 0.08, out of a total between-cells variance of 0.77). As such, the observed 
pattern is a match to the hypothesized shape. In sum, since the decrease in slack when 
moving from no honesty to the honesty trigger condition is larger for earned than for 
endowed information, I find support for my hypothesis that honesty concerns have a larger 
effect in mitigating slack for earned information than for endowed information. 
Supplemental analyses 
Motivation 
 In the post-experimental questionnaire, I included several questions to gain a better 
understanding of managers’ motivation in making their reporting choices. I focus on 
managers’ other-regarding preferences and their motivation to be honest. All questions are 
presented on a Likert scale with 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree. 
 First, I investigate managers’ fairness motivation when making their reporting choice, 
an important aspect of other-regarding preferences, by examining the statement “I wanted to 
treat the owner fairly.” In my theory development and the analyses above, I assume that this 
type of motivation does not differ between conditions. Indeed, in order to attribute the 
difference between the no honesty and honesty trigger condition to the incremental effect of 
honesty, other motivations should remain constant. Results are in line with this assumption 
and show that the fairness measure does not differ significantly across the four conditions 
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(descriptive statistics tabulated in Table 2 panel A, two-tailed p-values of the main and 
interaction effects all larger than 0.43). Within the no honesty trigger condition, the mean is 
4.10 for endowed information and 3.71 for earned information (two-tailed p = 0.43). Recall 
that managers induced more slack with earned relative to endowed information when the 
reporting context did not trigger honesty. Hence, this fairness measure being rather similar 
across conditions also indicates that managers who earn information do not feel that they treat 
the owner less fairly by claiming more slack. In other words, when a trade-off is made 
between their own wealth maximization and others’ payoffs, managers might feel justified in 
maximizing their wealth to a higher extent with earned information. The relatively high 
average (5.48) of the statement “Since I expended effort to find out the actual cost, I feel like 
I deserve a higher payoff” for participants in the earned information condition without 
honesty trigger provides some additional support for this claim. The average on this question 
for participants who earned information in the condition with the honesty trigger equals 4.36, 
which is significantly lower (p = 0.01), consistent with what theory suggests. 
 Second, when I asked participants whether it is unethical to report a cost (honesty 
trigger condition) or to allocate a portion of the profit (no honesty trigger condition) that 
results in a significantly higher payoff for managers than for owners, managers with earned 
versus endowed information evaluated this question differently (see Table 2 panel A for 
descriptives). A main effect exists for the reporting context (p = 0.01), in that managers in the 
honesty trigger condition agree with this statement more than managers in the no honesty 
trigger condition. Since the reporting context manipulation is supposed to increase the 
salience of honesty, this result is in line with my expectations. However, closer examination 
of the honesty trigger condition reveals that the average is marginally significantly higher for 
earned information than for endowed information (4.86 for earned information versus 4.04 
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for endowed information, p = 0.06). Thus, I find some evidence that ethical concerns are 
triggered more with earned information, which is consistent with theory.  
Earned information: perceived task difficulty and stress 
 Finally, I study two aspects related to earning information in more detail: perceived 
task difficulty and stress. Task difficulty refers to the amount of attention and mental effort 
required for successful performance (Kahneman 1973; Ashton 1990). I expect that the more 
difficult the task was perceived to be, the more managers should feel they expended effort to 
acquire their information. Similarly, stress is an important indicator of effort (Shields et al. 
2000; Bonner and Sprinkle 2002). Consequently, the more stressful it was for managers to 
solve the puzzles, the more they should feel they expended effort to acquire their information. 
Given the theory, these feelings should in turn be reflected in the amount of opportunistic 
reporting. That is, feeling that information was acquired in an effortful way should lead to 
more opportunistic reporting in the no honesty trigger condition, but it should decrease 
opportunistic reporting to a larger extent when moving to the honesty trigger condition. 
 To test this interpretation, I run some additional analyses on the earned information 
sample. In the post-experimental questionnaire, I included the following statement to measure 
the perceived task-difficulty “Solving these number series puzzles was difficult.” Managers 
responded using a 7-point Likert scale with 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree. 
Scores range from 2 to 7 with a mean of 3.24. I split managers into low- and high-difficulty 
subsamples and graphically present the corresponding Average Slack measures across the 
reporting contexts in panel A of Figure 2.16 This representation shows that slack is higher 
                                                          
16 I expect that using a higher number of hints when solving the puzzle reduces the feeling that information was 
earned, while a higher perceived task difficulty increases the feeling that information was earned. The number 
of hints used is rather low (on average 1.88 out of 16 hints were requested), but nevertheless, the variable Task 
Difficulty is significantly correlated with the number of hints used (r = 0.53, two-tailed p < 0.01). Hence, the 
number of hints used and the perceived task difficulty are positively correlated but will influence slack in 
opposing directions. When I control for the number of used hints in the reported tests, all effects remain 
significant at the same level. 
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with greater perceived task difficulty when the reporting context does not trigger honesty 
(0.73 for low difficulty versus 0.79 for high difficulty). In contrast, slack is lower when the 
task is perceived as more difficult relative to less difficult with an honesty trigger (0.56 for 
low difficulty versus 0.39 for high difficulty). In line with my main analyses, I test the 
significance of these results with an ANCOVA and a planned contrast with codes of 2, 1, −1, 
and −2 for the high perceived task difficulty/no honesty trigger condition, low perceived task 
difficulty/no honesty trigger condition, low perceived task difficulty/honesty trigger 
condition, and high perceived task difficulty/honesty trigger conditions, respectively. The 
simple effects test indicates the effect of task difficulty within the no honesty trigger 
condition is not significant (p = 0.26), but the reporting context significantly affects Average 
Slack (p < 0.01). The interaction effect of the ANCOVA (p = 0.05) and the planned contrast 
are also significant (F = 17.37, p < 0.01, tabulated in Table 4 panel A), indicating that higher 
perceived task difficulty decreases slack to a larger extent when moving from the no honesty 
to the honesty trigger condition.17 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 Similar results are obtained for the level of stress participants felt when solving the 
puzzles. The more stress managers felt, the more likely they should feel that they expended 
effort to acquire their information. Managers indicated on a 7-point Likert response scale 
with 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree how much they agreed with the following 
statement: “I felt stressed while solving these number sequence puzzles.” Scores range from 1 
to 6 with a mean of 2.90. I split managers into low- and high-stressed subsamples and 
graphically present their Average Slack means across the reporting context conditions in 
                                                          
17 The insignificance and the small size of the contrast residual variance as reported in Panel A of Table 4 
strengthen this inference. 
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Figure 2, panel B.18 In the no honesty trigger condition, managers induced marginally 
significantly more slack when they experienced higher stress (0.68 for low stress versus 0.83 
for high stress, p = 0.07). The main effect in the ANCOVA test shows the reporting context 
has a significant effect on Average Slack (p < 0.01). Moreover, the interaction effect between 
stress and honesty trigger is marginally significant (p = 0.08). The planned contrast with 
codes 2, 1, −1, and −2 for high perceived stress/no honesty trigger, low perceived stress/no 
honesty trigger, low perceived stress/honesty trigger, and high perceived stress/honesty 
trigger conditions, respectively, also show the predicted pattern is highly significant (F = 
16.91, p < 0.01, see panel B of Table 4).19 
 In summary, these results indicate that feeling that information is acquired in an 
effortful way influences the creation of slack in a consistent manner. When managers felt 
more strongly that they expended effort to acquire information (measured by higher 
perceived task difficulty and more stress), they reported more opportunistically when the 
reporting context did not trigger honesty. However, with higher perceived task difficulty and 
more stress, the decrease in opportunistic reporting was larger when moving to the condition 
that triggers honesty, which indicates honesty considerations are stronger for managers who 
feel that their information was acquired in an effortful way.  
5. Discussion 
 This paper investigates whether managers’ tendency to report opportunistically is 
affected by how they acquired the information they need to report. The theory I develop 
suggests there might be opposing effects from information acquisition on the two variables 
                                                          
18 The stress variable used in this analysis is marginally significantly correlated with the number of hints used (r 
= −0.26, two-tailed p = 0.10). When I include the number of hints used as a covariate, all p-values remain at the 
same significance level. 
19 The insignificance and the small size of the contrast residual variance as reported in panel B of Table 4 
strengthen this inference. 
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previously identified as mitigating opportunistic reporting: other-regarding and honesty 
preferences. By manipulating the reporting context in an experiment, I can examine the 
conditions under which each effect will dominate. I also manipulate whether participants are 
endowed with their information or have to exert intellectual effort to earn it. Results indicate 
that earning information increases opportunistic reporting because individuals feel that they 
deserve the benefits of it. However, when the reporting context triggers honesty concerns, the 
negative effect of earned information on opportunistic reporting is alleviated because 
managers care more about honesty with earned information than with endowed information. 
 These findings contribute to a better understanding of information acquisition, a 
crucial aspect of various accounting settings, including auditing, budgeting, financial 
statements, and taxes (e.g., Balakrishnan 1991; Einhorn and Ziv 2007; Sansing 1993; Nelson 
and Tayler 2007). Although effortful information acquisition has received some attention in 
the financial statements literature (Nelson and Tayler 2007), studying this factor in other 
domains can provide valuable additional insights. Indeed, whereas Nelson and Tayler (2007) 
investigate how effortful information acquisition affects perceived importance and weighting 
of this information for financial statement users, I focus on how it influences other-regarding 
and honesty concerns and the subsequent managerial reporting decisions. In that way, my 
findings also have important implications for practice. For example, in complex business 
environments in which information acquisition is labor intensive, making honesty concerns 
more salient (e.g., by incorporating honesty into the reporting context) may be more 
advisable relative to environments in which information is acquired more easily. 
 I also make a contribution to the budgeting literature by taking a crucial real-life 
aspect into account. In previous experiments, participants were usually endowed with the 
information they had to report, but I recognize that acquiring information requires effort. 
Consequently, I can show that effortful information acquisition has opposing effects on the 
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impact of other-regarding preferences and honesty preferences in mitigating opportunistic 
reporting.  
 This study has several limitations, which provide opportunities for future research. 
For example, since owners never learn the project’s actual implementation cost, managers 
cannot show that they acquire and report correct information. Hence, impression management 
cannot play a role, which might be especially important for earned information. Future 
research can examine how impression management affects opportunistic reporting with 
earned information. In addition, I did not allow discretion in the earned information condition 
(i.e., managers did not have the choice to earn information or to be endowed with it). 
Although discretion in effortless information acquisition has already been investigated in 
earlier research (e.g., Church et al. 2014), examining whether discretion in costly information 
acquisition affects managerial reporting could be interesting. Moreover, I deliberately 
focused on cognitive effort in my experiment since this type of effort is often necessary to 
acquire information in today’s business environment. However, future research might 
investigate whether different types of effort to acquire information (cognitive, mechanical, 
etc.) affect decisions and judgments in a similar way. Finally, the information participants 
acquired in my experiment did not involve any uncertainty. Hence, factors such as risk-
averseness and judgment could not play a role. Future research can examine how adding such 
contextual variables could potentially affect my findings.   
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Figure 1 The Effect of Information Acquisitiona and Reporting Contextb on Average Slackc, 
Controlling for Machiavellianismd 
 
 
a Information Acquisition is manipulated between subjects. Under the earned information condition, 
manager-participants could read their private information (the project’s cost) from their computer 
screen in every period. Under the endowed information condition, managers had to exert effort (i.e., 
solve number series puzzles) to find out this private information. 
b Reporting Context is also manipulated on a between-subject basis. Under the no honesty trigger 
condition, managers reported the share of profit allocated to the owner. Under the honesty trigger 
condition, they reported the project’s cost.  
c Average Slack is the ratio of the eight-period mean of slack claimed over slack available. This 
measure ranges from 0% to 100%. The higher this ratio, the more opportunistically managers 
reported. 
d Machiavellianism is the mean of four items measured on a Likert scale from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 
(totally agree): (1) I tend to manipulate others to get my way, (2) I have used deceit or lied to get my 
way, (3) I have used flattery to get my way, and (4) I tend to exploit others toward my own end. 
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Figure 2 The Effect of Perceived Task Difficultya, Stressb, and Reporting Contextc on 
Average Slackd, controlling for Machiavellianisme, within Earned Information Conditions 
 
Panel A: Average Budgetary Slack for Low and High Perceived Task Difficulty 
 
Panel B: Average Budgetary Slack for Low and High Perceived Stress 
 
a Perceived Task Difficulty comes from the post-experimental questionnaire. Participants indicated on 
a scale from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”) the extent to which they agreed with the 
following statement: “Solving these number series puzzles was difficult.” A median split divided 
participants in high- and low-difficulty subsamples. 
b Perceived Stress comes from the post-experimental questionnaire. Participants indicated on a scale 
from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”) the extent to which they agreed with the 
following statement: “I felt stressed while solving these number series puzzles.” A median split 
divided participants in high- and low-stressed subsamples. 
c Reporting Context is manipulated on a between-subject basis. Under the no honesty trigger 
condition, managers reported the share of profit allocated to the owner. Under the honesty trigger 
condition, they reported the project’s cost.  
d Average Slack is the ratio of the eight-period mean of slack claimed over slack available. This 
measure ranges from 0% to 100%. The higher this ratio, the more opportunistically managers 
reported. 
e Machiavellianism is the mean of four items measured on a Likert scale from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 
(totally agree): (1) I tend to manipulate others to get my way, (2) I have used deceit or lied to get my 
way, (3) I have used flattery to get my way, and (4) I tend to exploit others toward my own end. 
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TABLE 1 
Payoff Structure for Managers and Owners across the Reporting Context 
 
 Manager Owner 
No honesty trigger 100 + project’s total profit − portion allocated to 
owner 
Portion allocated by manager 
Honesty trigger 100 + reported cost − actual cost 200 − reported cost 
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TABLE 2 
Manager Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Means and (Standard Deviations), adjusted for Machiavellianisma 
 
 No Honesty Trigger Honesty Trigger 
 Endowed 
Information  
n=20 
Earned 
Information 
n=21 
Endowed 
Information 
n=20 
Earned 
Information 
n=20 
Average Slackb 0.61 (0.23) 0.74 (0.23) 0.56 (0.24) 0.48 (0.24) 
Fairness Motivationc 4.10 (1.57) 3.71 (1.56) 3.56 (1.61) 3.70 (1.57) 
Ethical Perceptiond 3.61 (1.65) 3.61 (1.64) 4.04 (1.68) 4.86 (1.65) 
Machiavellianism 3.91 (1.17) 3.56 (1.46) 3.03 (0.93) 3.93 (1.25) 
      
Panel B: Pearson Correlation Matrix (n= 81) 
 
    
Variable 1 2 3 4 
1 Average Slack 1    
2 Fairness Motivation − 0.58*** 1   
3 Ethical Perception − 0.02 − 0.19* 1  
4 Machiavellianism 0.30*** − 0.11 − 0.13 1 
a Machiavellianism is included as a covariate in all my analyses and is the mean of four items 
measured on a Likert scale from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree): (1) I tend to manipulate 
others to get my way, (2) I have used deceit or lied to get my way, (3) I have used flattery to get my 
way, and (4) I tend to exploit others toward my own end. 
b Average Slack is the ratio of the eight-period mean of slack claimed over slack available. This 
measure ranges from 0 to1. The higher this ratio, the more opportunistically managers reported. 
c Fairness Motivation comes from the post-experimental questionnaire. Participants indicated on a 
scale from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”) the extent to which they agreed with the 
following statement: “I wanted to treat the owner fairly.” 
d Ethical Perception comes from the post-experimental questionnaire. Participants indicated on a scale 
from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”) the extent to which they agreed with the 
following statement: “It is unethical to report a cost (honesty trigger condition) / allocate a portion of 
the profit (no honesty trigger condition) that results in a significantly higher payoff for managers than 
for owners.” 
*,**,*** Indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels (two-tailed). 
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TABLE 3 
Main Analyses – Average Slacka 
 
Panel A: ANCOVA for Information Acquisitionb, Reporting Contextc and Machiavallianismd 
on Average Slack 
 
Factor df Mean Square F p-value* 
 Information Acquisition (IA) 1 0.02 0.27  0.61 
 Reporting Context (RC) 1 0.50 9.18 <0.01 
 IA × RC 1 0.22 4.13 0.02 
 Machiavellianismd 1 0.50 9.18 <0.01 
 Error 76 0.05   
 
Panel B: Planned Contrast Analysis  
  
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F-statistic p-value* 
Contraste 0.690 1 0.69 12.736 <0.01 
Residual Variancef 0.079 2 0.04 0.731 0.48 
Machiavellianism 0.499 1 0.499 9.203 <0.01 
Error 4.12 76 0.05   
             
a Average Slack is the ratio of the eight-period mean of slack claimed over slack available. This 
measure ranges from 0 to 1. The higher this ratio, the more opportunistically managers reported. 
b Information Acquisition is manipulated between subjects. Under the earned information condition, 
manager-participants could read their private information (the project’s cost) from their computer 
screen in every period. Under the endowed information condition, managers had to perform effort 
(i.e., solve number series puzzles) to find out this private information. 
c Reporting Context is also manipulated on a between-subject basis. Under the no honesty trigger 
condition, managers reported the share of profit allocated to the owner. Under the honesty trigger 
condition, they reported the project’s cost.  
d Machiavellianism is the mean of four items measured on a Likert scale from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 
(totally agree): (1) I tend to manipulate others to get my way, (2) I have used deceit or lied to get my 
way, (3) I have used flattery to get my way, and (4) I tend to exploit others toward my own end. 
e The model contrast tests whether average slack follows the pattern as follows from the theory. 
Contrast coefficients are 2, 1, −1, and −2 for the earned information/no honesty trigger, endowed 
information/no honesty trigger, endowed information/honesty trigger, and earned information/honesty 
trigger conditions, respectively. 
f The residual variance represents the variance that is not explained by the model contrast. The 
insignificant p-value shows that the model contrast explains all of the between-group variance. 
* p-values are reported on a two-tailed basis, except the ones in bold, which are reported on a one-
tailed basis given the directional effects of the hypothesis. 
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TABLE 4 
Additional Analyses: Planned Contrasts on Average Slacka within the Earned Information 
Conditions 
 
Panel A: Low and High Perceived Task Difficulty 
  
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F-statistic p-value* 
Contrastb 0.81 1 0.81 17.37 <0.01 
Residual Variancec 0.04 2 0.02 0.44 0.65 
Machiavellianismd 0.27 1 0.27 5.66 0.02 
Error 1.68 36 0.05   
 
 
     
Panel B: Low and High Perceived Stress 
      
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F-statistic p-value* 
Contraste 0.81 1 0.81 16.91 <0.01 
Residual Variancec 0.01 2 0.01 0.13 0.88 
Machiavellianism 0.28 1 0.28 5.76 0.02 
Error 1.72 36 0.05   
a Average Slack is the ratio of the eight-period mean of slack claimed over slack available. This 
measure ranges from 0 to 1. The higher this ratio, the more opportunistically managers reported. 
b The model contrast tests whether average slack follows the pattern as follows from the theory. 
Contrast coefficients are 2, 1, −1, and −2 for the high task difficulty/no honesty trigger, low task 
difficulty/no honesty trigger, low task difficulty/honesty trigger, and high task difficulty/honesty 
trigger conditions, respectively. 
c The residual variance represents the variance that is not explained by the model contrast. The 
insignificant p-value shows that the model contrast explains all of the between-group variance. 
d Machiavellianism is the mean of four items measured on a Likert scale from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 
(totally agree): (1) I tend to manipulate others to get my way, (2) I have used deceit or lied to get my 
way, (3) I have used flattery to get my way, and (4) I tend to exploit others toward my own end. 
e The model contrast tests whether average slack follows the pattern as follows from the theory. 
Contrast coefficients are 2, 1, −1, and −2 for the high stress/no honesty trigger, low stress/no honesty 
trigger, low stress/honesty trigger, and high stress/honesty trigger conditions, respectively. 
* p-values are reported on a two-tailed basis. 
 
